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ABSTRACT
Support Vector Machines and Metamorphic Malware Detection
by Tanuvir Singh
Metamorphic malware changes its internal structure with each infection,
which makes it challenging to detect. In this research, we test several scor-
ing techniques that have shown promise in metamorphic detection. We then
perform a careful robustness analysis by employing morphing strategies that
cause each score to fail. Finally, we show that combining scores using a Sup-
port Vector Machine (SVM) yields results that are significantly more robust
than we obtained using any of the individual scores.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Malware also known as Malicious software is a software program which
intends to perform malicious activities on a computer. It can be used to steal
sensitive information or to gain un-authorized access to private networks [16].
Different malware are created for different purposes. A malware that changes
its internal structure each time it infects a new system is referred to as a
metamorphic malware. Once a system has been infected, an antivirus software
needs to identify the infection and take steps to eradicate it. A lot of malware
are created by developers these days to generate money. In this paper we use
the terms virus and malware interchangeably.
As the quantity of new and unknown malware is on the rise by the day,
analysis of different kind of malware and their detection has become a prime
research area. Malware detection strategies need to be updated regularly so
as to cope up with increasing diversity in metamorphic malware. Various
techniques have been proposed in the past for malware detection. Initial tech-
niques which were based on virus signature cannot be used for detection of
metamorphic malware. In recent years many new machine learning techniques
have been proposed for detection of metamorphic malware. Statistical mal-
ware detection techniques are based on some statistical characteristics of a
malware file, an example being Hidden Markov Models (HMM) [26]. Sim-
ilarity based techniques try to establish a similarity measure between files
of the same family, Simple Substitution Distance is an interesting similarity
based technique discussed in paper [24]. Examples of graph-based techniques
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include Opcode Graph Similarity discussed in [23] and Function Call Graph
technique discussed in [8]. Entropy analysis, compression rates, and Principal
Component Analysis (PCA) are examples of Structural-based techniques. In
our research we will be implementing a subset of these scoring techniques and
then will try to devise some kind of morphing strategies to break each of these
scores. Our main aim here is to use minimum amount of morphing which is
sufficient to produce some kind of misclassification. Then we try to devise a
combined morphing strategy that can break all of our scores with minimum
amount of morphing. Finally, we will implement a Support Vector Machine
(SVM) [18] that will serve to generate an optimal combination of scores, and
we will measure the success of this SVM-based score in comparison to the
individual scores.
This paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we discuss about avail-
able background information on malware with an emphasis on metamorphic
malware. Chapter 3 outlines previously implemented statistical and similarity
based metamorphic malware detection techniques that form the basis for the
research in this paper. Then in Chapter 4, we cover the Support Vector Ma-
chines and discuss our specific implementation using Rapidminer. Next, we
look at three different malware detection scores such as Hidden Markov Model,
Simple Substitution distance and Opcode Graph Similarity techniques. Then
we consider a combination of the these three scores using Support Vector Ma-
chines. These topics are covered in Chapter 5. Then in Chapter 6 we apply all
of our metamorphic detection strategies to some new classes of malware and
then compare the results produced by SVMs against the results produced by
other three techniques. Chapter 7 contains our conclusions and considerations
2
for future work.
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CHAPTER 2
Background
A software program developed with an intention to harm another com-
puter or software is known as malware. Malware are developed with different
goals in mind. Usage varies from stealing information, damaging files on a com-
puter to earning money as a developer. malware are hidden and distributed
through a variety of channels such as seemingly legit online software download
s, CDs installs, email attachments etc. Hence, firewalls and antivirus softwares
are needed to be run frequently for malware detection and removal [19].
2.1 Types of Malware
Malware is a generic term which covers a wide range of malicious soft-
wares. The term malware can refer to any of the following:
2.1.1 Trojans
Term Trojan horse is derived from the deceptive horse used in the ancient
war of troy. It refers to a software program that presents itself as a legit
software but means harm to the host machine. It lures user into clicking on
unauthentic links, email attachments, downloading seemingly genuine files,
etc., to penetrate the host system and get executed without user’s knowledge.
Trojan horse can be used to monitor user activity, get remote machine or web
cam access, execute other harmful softwares or to steal personal information
from the host system. However, trojans do not replicate or spread themselves
thereby differ from viruses and worms [3].
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2.1.2 Worms
Worm is a malicious software program that can spread itself without any
user intervention and hence is self sufficient. It generally uses host machine’s
network to jump and infect other machines on the network as the infected
document travels from one machine to another. Worm can be as small as a
macro in a word document. Worms can collapse an entire network just by using
up the bandwidth and not performing any malicious activity [3]. Developers
also use it to create backdoors and bot nets.
2.1.3 Viruses
Viruses get executed at whatever point the infected frameworks are
booted. Once executed virus can spread itself by multiplying its copies and
infecting other files and programs [3]. However, viruses are a lot different from
worms as human action is required in order to spread viruses. One of the most
typical scenario is copying data using an infected thumb drive on different
machines thereby spreading viruses on each of the host machines.
2.1.3.1 Encrypted viruses
To evade antivirus softwares malware needs to change its body with each
infection. The easiest technique that can be used for this is by encrypting the
virus body. Encrypted viruses generally use simple encryption techniques such
as computing XOR of a key with each byte of the virus body. Such viruses
also have a decryption block of code along with the encrypted body. However,
decryption code remains same across all variations of the virus thereby making
it vulnerable to detection. Hence, even though the scanner component of
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antivirus software cannot decrypt the virus body, a signature based detection
is highly probable [15]. The first such virus was developed in 1987 called
Cascade [22].
2.1.3.2 Polymorphic viruses
In addition to the rather simple encrypted viruses, polymorphic viruses
have an additional component called mutation engine. Mutation engine plays
a crucial role in efficiently changing the body of the virus. Encypted virus
body and the mutation engine is first decrypted by decryption module once
the virus is downloaded on the host machine. Every infection then generates
a new virus body and decryptor using the encrypted mutation engine [22].
Anti-virus softwares can detect polymorphic viruses by using the method of
heuristic analysis in sandbox mode. The first such virus is 1260 developed in
1990 [29].
2.1.3.3 Metamorphic viruses
Metamorphic viruses are the most advanced form of viruses. These are
different from polymorphic viruses in a way that they do not have a decryptor
or encrypted virus body. Instead “Metamorphic viruses spread by keeping the
base functionality same but by changing their whole body i.e. by rewriting
themselves”. Hence, generations differ only in the code of the virus [15].
Metamorphic viruses use morphing techniques to change their code before
each infection. Few elementary morphing techniques are discussed below.
Subroutines Permutation It is important to change the structure of the
virus code in order to change its appearance. We can achieve this by
6
inserting random methods between two functional methods in the code.
Thus, antivirus softwares based on structural similarity are not be able
to detect such viruses easily. One such virus is win32/Ghost [34].
Instruction Reordering Instruction reordering works by identifying inde-
pendent instructions within each functional module of the virus code.
Such instructions execute independently with respect to other instruc-
tions. Reordering these leads to different appearance but same function-
ality. Due to its simplicity this technique can be easily used to generate
different generations of metamorphic viruses [22].
Instruction Substitution This technique uses functional equivalents to re-
place one or more instructions in the virus code [32].
Register Swapping Another simple approach for keeping the generations
different is to just change the registers used by different instructions
in the code. A simple swap of registers each time meaning using them
alternatively is one of the most trivial examples. Win95/Regs wap [34] is
one of the many metamorphic malware which makes use of this morphing
technique.
Garbage Instruction Insertion Garbage instruction insertion technique
uses “do-nothing” instructions for code obfuscation. Such statements
primarily do not have any effect on the code functionally and act as
dummy code lines once inserted [7]. Win95/ZPerm [29] is the most com-
mon example.
Malware writers have even created metamorphic “engines”, which are now
available publicly and can be used to generate metamorphic copies of a given
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malware. These engines are referred to as “Virus Construction Kits” and can be
used to create functionally equivalent copies of an executable, and hence ease
the process of creating different generations of existing malware. Few examples
of such kits are Phalcon/Skism, NGVCK [25], Mass-Produced Code generator
(PS-MPC), MPCGEN and Second Generation virus generator (G2) [31]. We
focus on NGVCK in sections ahead because it was found to be one of the best
engines capable of producing entirely different metamorphic copies in previous
researches [25].
2.2 Detection Techniques
With the rapid increase in types and intricacy of obfuscation techniques
utilized by malware writers, there is great requirement for antivirus softwares
to keep up with the pace. Hence, there lies a vast scope for research and
possibilities in detection techniques. Currently multiple techniques are used for
malware detection which focus on varied parameters. Some of these techniques
are discussed below in detail.
2.2.1 Signature Based Detection
Signature based detection is based on scanning programs and files and
computing signatures for each of them. Signature based detection involves
searching for a known pattern, referred to as signature, in a given executable
file. Most of the antivirus manufacturers maintain a large repository of unique
signature for each known virus which is updated on a regular basis [3]. When
an anti-virus software scans an executable, it generates the signature of the
executable file and looks for a match in its database, if a match is found
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the executable is deemed to be infected. Signature based detection scheme is
used on a vast scale because it is simple, accurate and fast [26]. One of the
drawbacks of this technique is that it requires a continuous update of signatures
for newly found malware. Also it cannot be used to detect previously unknown
malware as it can only detect malware with a known signature. Another of
its drawbacks is that it is very easy to evade signature based detection, simple
obfuscation techniques like polymorphism and metamorphism can be used to
evade signature based detection [21].
2.2.2 Behavior Based Detection
Behavior based detection is another legacy technique wherein the focus
is on the actions that a malware performs during its execution and trying to
understand the intent of the malware using various techniques. In behavior
based detection, the behavior of both benign files and malware files are studied
during the first phase generally referred to as the training or learning phase
and then during the monitoring phase, we use the information gathered in the
training phase to classify a given executable as either malware or benign [12].
2.2.3 Anomaly Based Detection
It is a technique which is inherently similar to behavior based detection. It
can actually be seen as a slight variation of behavior based detection, wherein
analysis is done by studying the behavior of all files in the training phase,
and during the monitoring phase we look out for files which show deviation
from normal behavior, such files are classified as infected. However, this tech-
nique is more susceptible to false positives. In [30] an unsupervised approach
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for “Anomaly-based Malware Detection using Hardware Features” has been
discussed.
2.2.4 Statistical Malware Detection
Conventional approaches like signature detection cannot be used in the
case of metamorphic malware as they evade signature detection by morph-
ing their code. Although metamorphic malware copies can differ from each
other a great deal, but still some of the statistics of the metamorphic mal-
ware files remains the same. A variety of other techniques, including machine
learning [33] and statistical analysis [10] have been studied. In addition, some
improved techniques for evading these metamorphic detection schemes have
been considered in [15].
2.2.4.1 Hidden Markov Model Based Detection
In recent years a lot of machine learning techniques have been used in the
detection of malware, specifically metamorphic malware which cannot be de-
tected by using traditional malware detection techniques. Most of the machine
learning techniques work on the principle of analyzing a particular family of
virus for some kind of similarity score, which can then be used to detect an
incoming file as either a malware belonging to the same family or as a benign
file. One of such technique is Hidden Markov Model (HMM), which is one
of the most popular machine learning techniques used in the field of malware
detection [26]. In this technique, a Hidden Markov Model is trained against
known malware opcode sequence [17]. Once the training phase is over, the
trained model is used to score incoming files. The score is then compared to
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a predefined threshold, if it is more than the threshold, the file is classified as
an infected file [33]. We will discuss more about this technique in Section 3.1.
2.2.5 Similarity Based Detection
This kind of detection is based on some kind of a similarity measure
defined between the metamorphic and benign files. It revolves around finding
some kind of characteristics which are similar for a given metamorphic malware
family. In previous researches a lot of similarity based detection strategies
have been discussed which are all based on analyzing characteristics of opcode
sequences of malware files. Some of these techniques are pairwise sequence
alignment [1, 20], n-gram similarity [33], cosine similarity [14], and chi-squared
similarity [10].
2.2.5.1 Opcode Graph Based Detection
Opcode graph based techniques are the techniques which involve analyz-
ing the graphs generated by opcode sequences instead of analyzing the files
themselves. For detection a weighted directed graph is constructed by analyz-
ing a metamorphic malware family. Then a graph is constructed for the file
under consideration. Finally the two graphs can be compared to generate a
score. The technique works by calculating the absolute difference between cor-
responding elements in the two graphs. If the computed score is low it means
that the two files are similar and hence the file is classified as a malware file
otherwise it is classified as a benign file [23]. We will discuss more about this
technique in Section 3.2.
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2.2.5.2 Simple Substitution Based Detection
Simple substitution is another detection technique which is based on a
similarity measure. This technique uses approach which is very similar to the
use of simple substitution ciphers in cryptanalysis. It uses Jackobsen’s fast
algorithm similar to its use in cryptanalysis. Then we try to establish a kind
of a similarity score by trying to convert the matrix formed by the opcode
sequences of a given malware to that of the fuel under consideration [24]. We
will discuss more about this technique in Section 3.3.
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CHAPTER 3
Statistical and Similarity based Malware Detection
Signature based detection is one of the most common method used by
antivirus softwares for malware detection. But it cannot be used to detect
metamorphic malware, as metamorphic malware evade signature based detec-
tion by morphing its body in such a way that the internal structure of the
morphed malware is completely different from its original copy. Even though
the internal structure of the malware has been completely changed by morph-
ing, but still, the instructions that this new morphed malware executes have to
be the same in order to perform the same actions. This means that in one way
or the other the distribution of these instructions will be the same across all
morphed copies. Based on these assumptions various malware detection tech-
niques have been devised, we discuss some of these techniques in the coming
sections.
3.1 Hidden Markov Model Method
Hidden Markov Model also referred to as HMM in coming sections is
a technique which can be used to recognize patterns. We can use a slight
modification of this technique to detect metamorphic malware. A Hidden
Markov Model can be trained based on a representative set of malware files
and then can be used to detect if given file belongs to a particular malware
family or not. We use log likelihood per opcode(LLPO) as a measure to score
these files. Once we have trained a Hidden Markov model we can then use
it to score new files, these new scores can then be compared to a predefined
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value also known as threshold. If the score generated by a file is greater then
the threshold value then it can be inferred that the given file belongs to the
same metamorphic malware family.
3.1.1 Hidden Markov Model
Hidden Markov Model(HMM) Markov Process whose states are un-
known [26]. The notation used in HMM is described in [26] as follows:
𝑇 = length of the observation sequence
𝑁 = number of states in the model
𝑀 = number of observation symbols
𝑄 = {𝑞0, 𝑞1, . . . , 𝑞𝑁−1} = distinct states of the Markov process
𝑉 = {0, 1, . . . ,𝑀 − 1} = set of possible observations
𝐴 = state transition probabilities
𝐵 = observation probability matrix
𝜋 = initial state distribution
𝒪 = (𝒪0,𝒪1, . . . ,𝒪𝑇−1) = observation sequence.
A model is defined using these known values as
𝜆 = (𝐴,𝐵, 𝜋)
Figure 1 gives a graphical view of the Hidden Markov Process. The state
and observation of HMM at any point of time 𝑡 is represented by 𝑋𝑡 and 𝒪𝑡
respectively, as shown in Figure 1.
3.1.2 Implementation
In our implementation we start of by training a Hidden Markov Model
based on set of given metamorphic malware files. Once the model has been
trained this model represents the statistical properties that define the given
malware family in some way. We can then use this resulting model to score
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𝒪0 𝒪1 𝒪2 · · · 𝒪𝑇−1
𝑋0 𝑋1 𝑋2 · · · 𝑋𝑇−1𝐴 𝐴 𝐴 𝐴
𝐵 𝐵 𝐵 𝐵
Figure 1: Hidden Markov Model
a file under consideration and then predict whether it belongs to the same
family that the model was trained upon or not. In the training phase we
extracted sequence of opcodes from given executable files by disassembling
these files into machine level code. The we created an observation sequence
out of these opcode sequence by combining all of them into a long string of
opcode sequences.
Once we have trained our HMM on this given observation sequence we
can then use this resulting model to score a file under consideration, and then
predict whether it belongs to the same family or not. We would have two sets
of datasets, the test set and the compare set. The test set comprises of the
malware family under our consideration and the compare set usually comprises
of benign files. Then we compare the scores generated by the files in test set
to those generated by files in the compare set. Our main aim here is to get a
clear separation between the scores generated by each of these data sets. In
terms of LLPO our model should assign a higher LLPO value tot he files that
belong the the malware family under consideration and assign a lower score to
the comparison data set i.e. the benign files.
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After training a HMM on NGVCK virus files we use it to score a subset of
NGVCK malware files and also an equivalent number of benign files(Cygwin
files). Then we compare the scores generated by the test data set compris-
ing of the NGVCK files against those generated by the comparison data set
comprising of the benign files.
3.2 Opcode Graph Similarity
The given malware file is first disassembled to generate a sequence of
opcodes. This sequence of opcodes is then used to generate a directed graph.
To construct this directed graph, first of all we create nodes representing all
the unique opcodes that we encounter in the given malware file. Once we
have all the edges for this graph we insert edges between each pair of nodes
which occur as consecutive opcodes in the given file i.e. a directed edge is
constructed for each pair of opcodes opc1 and opc2 such that opc2 follows
opc1 in the sequence of opcodes for that particular file. The weight of that
edge is defined as the probability of these two opcodes in that particular order.
3.2.1 Implementation
Here our main aim is to construct an opcode graph for each file and then
compare opcode graphs from two files to generate a similarity score between
those two files. For this we go through the sequence of opcodes in a given file
and create an opcode graph. We create a weighted directed graph wherein each
node consists of a unique opcode in our file and the edges connecting different
opcodes are created for each opcode bigram in that file. We create this graph
for both the malware files as well as the benign files. For comparison we can
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then use these opcode graphs instead of the actual files. Here we discuss the
approach that has been previously studied in the paper [23].
Table 1 shows a subset of assembly language trace from a given metamor-
phic file:
Table 1: Opcode Sequence
Number Opcode Number Opcode
1 CALL 11 JMP
2 JMP 12 ADD
3 ADD 13 NOP
4 SUB 14 JMP
5 NOP 15 CALL
6 CALL 16 CALL
7 ADD 17 CALL
8 JMP 18 ADD
9 JMP 19 JMP
10 SUB 20 SUB
Table 2 shows a matrix containing count for each instruction digram in the
given file. There is a count value against each row-column opcode pair if they
exist in the opcode sequence one after the other and the value is determined as
the sum of all such occurences. So, the value against row 1 col 3 corresponds
to the count of instruction digrams involving ADD followed by JMP. Then, we
convert this table into a row-stochastic table by dividing each count by the
number of columns in the table. This leads to a matrix which provides us with
transition probabilities between successive opcodes as shown in Table 3. Then,
we generate a weighted directed graph for this table as shown in figure 2.
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Table 2: Opcode Count
ADD CALL JMP NOP SUB
ADD 0 0 2 1 1
CALL 2 2 1 0 0
JMP 2 1 1 0 2
NOP 0 1 1 0 0
SUB 0 0 1 1 0
Table 3: Probability Table
ADD CALL JMP NOP SUB
ADD 0 0 1
2
1
4
1
4
CALL 2
5
2
5
1
5
0 0
JMP 1
3
1
6
1
6
0 1
3
NOP 0 1
2
1
2
0 0
SUB 0 0 1
2
1
2
0
ADD CALL JMP
NOP
SUB
1/4
1/4
1/2
1/3
1/2
2/5
1/5
1/6
1/2
1/3
2/5
1/6
1/2
1/2
Figure 2: Opcode Graph
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Once we have the graph, we need to establish a threshold value which can
then be used to compare different scores by following the below steps:
1. Determine the opcode graphs for a set of malware family.
2. Determine the opcode graphs for a set of benign files.
3. Compute the scores for all pairs of metamorphic family viruses from step
1.
4. Determine the scores for differing pairs comprising of one family malware
from step 1 and one benign file from step 2.
5. Establish threshold values based on results from step 3 and step 4.
Once a threshold score has been established, we can use this score to
compare different sets of files. Now, to check if a given file belongs to a
particular malware family or not, we would first generate an opcode graph for
the given file. Then, we can compare this graph with that of a file from the
malware family in consideration. Once we have this score we can compare it
to our threshold value, if it is greater then the threshold value then we classify
the given file as a benign file otherwise as a malware file belonging to the same
family.
3.3 Simple Substitution Distance
It is an efficient technique which uses the similarity measure between two
given files for detection of metamorphic malware. This technique again relies
on the fact that we have a representative set of malware files belonging to the
same family. Here, we use a distance measure similar to the method used in
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cryptanalysis, which is based on simple substitution distance. This method
uses a hill climbing approach based on Jakobsen’s algorithm [13]. The main
idea behind the approach is based on the frequency of opcodes, assuming that
they stay the same for a given family. So, we can use Jakobsen’s algorithm to
compare the similarity of a given file against both a malware file and a benign
file.
3.3.1 Jakobsen Algorithm
Jakobsen’s algorithm is an algorithm which involves refining an initial
guess for the encryption key with each iteration. It is based on the assumption
that the cipher text is actually in English language and has only 26 different
symbols. So, each of these symbols represents a letter in the english language.
it is a very fast algorithm because the distribution matrix is only created once
and is then changed after every iteration to evaluate the plain text.
The algorithm starts of by calculating the frequency of all the symbols
in the cipher text. Once all the frequencies have been calculated we can
sort them in reverse order. Then we can compare the maximum frequencies
from the cipher text to english language character frequencies and generate a
putative key. The algorithm then runs various iterations to improve on this
key as follows:
3.3.2 Implementation
In our implementation we follow the same approach of extracting opcode
sequences from all the family files as discussed in the previous two sections.
Then we create bigram distribution matrix from these opcode sequences which
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Algorithm 1 Jakobsen’s Fast Attack on substitution ciphers
1: Initialize 𝐸 with expected digram frequencies
2: 𝐶 = Input cipher text
3: 𝐾 = Compute Initial Putative Key
4: 𝑃 = Putative plaintext by decrypting C using K
5: 𝐷 = Digram distribution matrix for P
6: 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝑑(𝐷,𝐸)
7: for 𝑖 = 1 to 𝑛− 1 do
8: for 𝑗 = 1 to 𝑛− 𝑖 do
9: 𝐷′ = 𝐷
10: swapRows(j, j+i)
11: swapColumns(j, j+i)
12: if d(D′,E) < score then
13: 𝐷 = 𝐷′
14: swapElements(j, j+i) {Swap elements of the putative key}
15: score = d(D’,E)
16: end if
17: end for
18: end for
19: return K
is the equivalent of 𝐸 matrix in Jackobsen’s algorithm [13]. Then we construct
another similar matrix for the file which we want to classify, this matrix is
equivalent of 𝐷 matrix in the algorithm. We constrain both of these matrices
to the most common 𝑛 opcodes. We add one more symbol to represent all the
other opcodes which were excluded from the list. So, we are left with 𝑛 + 1
symbols.
Then we choose an initial “key” 𝐾 such that it is a representative of the
frequency of opcodes in the malware family. We assume that the frequencies
of opcodes in family viruses should be the same as compared to the code that
we are suspecting.
Then we construct the equivalent of matrix 𝐷 by using the key 𝐾 to
decrypt. This is similar to the procedure followed in Jackobsen’s algorithm to
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construct𝐷. Once we have the 𝐸 and𝐷 matrices we make them row stochastic
so that the scores are not dependent on the size of the opcode sequence. For
example, if we have the below mentioned opcodes:
MOV, CALL, ADD, XOR, CMP
where the opcodes are in a reverse sorted order of their frequencies. Assume
that the sequence that we want to score is:
JMP, MOV, MOV, ADD, INC, INC, INC
the frequency counts for these will be:
Table 4: Opcode Frequency Counts
Opcode INC MOV ADD JMP
Frequency 3 2 1 1
So, our initial guess for the putative key 𝐾 is:
Table 5: Initial Putative Key Guess
Metamorphic Family MOV CALL ADD XOR
File to be scored INC MOV ADD JMP
By using the above putative key 𝐾 the decrypted sequence results in:
XOR, CALL, CALL, ADD, MOV, MOV, MOV
This gives us our initial 𝐷 matrix which is also referred to as digraph distri-
bution matrix as shown in table 6.
Once we have scored the 𝐷 and 𝐸 matrices against each other, the fol-
lowing step involves swapping the initial two opcodes in ‘putative key’ 𝑘, i.e.
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Table 6: Digraph Distribution Matrix
MOV CALL ADD XOR CMP OTHER
MOV 2 0 0 0 0 0
CALL 0 1 1 0 0 0
ADD 1 0 0 0 0 0
XOR 0 1 0 0 0 0
CMP 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 0 0 0 0 0 0
if we are looking at the first row then we will swap MOV and CALL, to achieve
this we can just swap the first row with the second row and repeat the same
with columns. This will result in our modified matrix shown in table 7.
Table 7: Modified Digraph Distribution Matrix
MOV CALL ADD XOR CMP OTHER
MOV 1 0 1 0 0 0
CALL 0 2 0 0 0 0
ADD 0 1 0 0 0 0
XOR 1 0 0 0 0 0
CMP 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 0 0 0 0 0 0
From here onwards our algorithm carries on in the same way as in Jack-
obsen’s algorithm [13]. The score for a given file is computed as the score of
the final 𝐷 matrix. In our implementation we limit the size of our matrices to
25, based on previous research done in paper [24].
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CHAPTER 4
Support Vector Machines
4.1 Introduction
Support vector machines are an example of supervised learning algorithms
which belong to both the regression and classification categories of machine
learning algorithms. SVMs is a collection of machine learning algorithms that
can be used to recognize pattens in given data [5]. Given a set of training data
we would like to classify new examples into one of the possible two categories.
For achieving such a task SVM training algorithm can be used to build a
model which is capable of performing such classification. We can define the
SVM model by having all the example from the training data represented as
points on a space. These points will be represented in the two dimensional
space such that there is an evident gap between data points belonging to our
two different classes. So for new points we can use this model to classify it
to one of these two classes based on which side of the gap it belongs to. This
kind of classification is known as linear classification [28].
4.1.1 SVM Example
SVM’s can be defined by using the concepts of decision planes and support
vectors. The decision planes are planes in the two dimensional space that
would represent the decision boundaries. Basically a decision plane is defined
as a plane which completely separates all data points belonging to two different
classes. Figure 3 shows an example of data points in two dimensional space.
In this example we have two different types of data points represented by
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Red and Green dots. The Green points refer to class A whereas Red points
refer to class B. If we look at the figure we can clearly see that we can plot a
line segment which can separate all the data points in a way that all points
belonging to one class are on one side and all the other points are on the other
side of the line segment. This line segment will be our decision plane. Any
new examples of data coming in can be classified based on this line segment,
if it falls on the left side then it belongs to class B otherwise it belongs to class
A [28].
Figure 3: Linear Classifier
The type of classification shown in Figure 3 is referred to as linear classi-
fication, i.e. the classifier separates two different classes of data by finding a
decision plane in between them.
But in some cases the classification problem is much tougher then the one
shown in Figure 3. An example of a different kind of classification problem is
shown in Figure 4. If we compare the two figures we can clearly see that the
classification task in the second is tougher and we cannot have a simple line
segment separating the two classes. In such situations we would have to plot
a curve instead. Classification problems which involve plotting of simple line
segments to differentiate between data points belonging to two different kinds
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are referred to as hyper plane classifiers [28]. These kind of problems are best
suited for Support Vector Machines.
Figure 4: Non Linear Classifier
But sometimes there are cases wherein we cannot separate the datasets
linearly. In such scenario’s support vector machines allow us to use a special
trick known as the kernel trick. A kernel trick is basically using some math-
ematical functions which are known as “kernels” to map the given data sets
into a new feature space(mapping). The only condition here is that when we
map our data points into this new feature space, the newly mapped points
should be linearly separable in this new feature space. So, we can change the
complex problem of plotting a curve into a simple problem of plotting a line
segment in the new feature space. Figure 5.
4.1.2 Kernel Mapping
Definition: A kernel is defined as a function that accepts two vectors x𝑖
and x𝑗 as inputs and produces an output which is defined as the inner product
of their images 𝜑(x𝑖) and 𝜑(x𝑗)
𝐾(x1,x2) = 𝜑(x1)
𝑇𝜑(x2)
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Figure 5: Kernel Mapping
We are not concerned about the dimensionality of the newly formed space
because we are only returning the inner products in the new space for the two
vectors.
The main idea here is to generate a learning algorithm that operates in
kernel space, which is generated by substituting the values of all inner products
from the original space into the newly formed kernel space:
𝑓(x) = 𝜑(x)𝑇w + 𝑏 =
𝑚∑︁
𝑗=1
𝛼𝑗𝑦𝑗𝐾(x,x𝑗) + 𝑏
The parameter 𝑏 can be found from any support vectors x𝑖
𝑏 = 𝑦𝑖 − 𝜑(x𝑖)𝑇w = 𝑦𝑖 −
𝑚∑︁
𝑗=1
𝛼𝑗𝑦𝑗(𝜑(x𝑖)
𝑇𝜑(x𝑗)) = 𝑦𝑖 −
𝑚∑︁
𝑗=1
𝛼𝑗𝑦𝑗𝐾(x𝑖,x𝑗)
4.1.3 Linear separation of a feature space
Let’s assume that we have a hyper plane in an 𝑛-dimensional (𝑛-D) orig-
inal feature space
𝑓(x) = x𝑇w + 𝑏 =
𝑛∑︁
𝑖=1
𝑥𝑖𝑤𝑖 + 𝑏 = 0
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where w = [𝑤1, · · · , 𝑤𝑛]𝑇 the weight vector is normal to the hyper plane,
and |𝑏|/||w|| is defined as the distance between the plane and origin [11]. Then
we can say that our 𝑛-Dimensional has been partitioned into two different
regions by this new hyper plane [11]. We can go ahead and define a mapping
function 𝑦 = sign(𝑓(x)) ∈ {1,−1}, i.e.,
𝑓(x) = x𝑇w + 𝑏 =
{︂
> 0, 𝑦 = sign(𝑓(x)) = 1, x ∈ 𝑃
< 0, 𝑦 = sign(𝑓(x)) = −1, x ∈ 𝑁
Any point x ∈ 𝑃 which exists on the positive side is mapped to 1, while
any point x ∈ 𝑁 which exists on the negative side is mapped to -1. A point x
of unknown class will be classified to 𝑃 if 𝑓(x) > 0, or 𝑁 if 𝑓(x) < 0 [11].
4.1.4 The learning problem
Given a set 𝐾 training samples from two linearly separable classes 𝑃 and
𝑁
{(x𝑘, 𝑦𝑘), 𝑘 = 1, · · · , 𝐾}
where 𝑦𝑘 ∈ {1,−1} labels x𝑘 to belong to either of the two classes. Our main
aim is to find a hyper-plane in terms of w and 𝑏, that linearly separates the
two classes.
Before w is properly trained, the actual output 𝑦′ = sign(𝑓(x)) may not
be the same as the desired output 𝑦. There are four possible cases:
Input (x, 𝑦) Output 𝑦′ = sign(𝑓(x)) result
1 (x, 𝑦 = 1) 𝑦′ = 1 = 𝑦 corrrect
2 (x, 𝑦 = −1) 𝑦′ = 1 ̸= 𝑦 incorrect
3 (x, 𝑦 = 1) 𝑦′ = −1 ̸= 𝑦 incorrect
4 (x, 𝑦 = −1) 𝑦′ = −1 = 𝑦 corrrect
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The weight vector w is updated whenever the result is incorrect (mistake
driven):
∙ If (x, 𝑦 = −1) but 𝑦′ = 1 ̸= 𝑦 (case 2 above), then
xnew = wold + 𝜂𝑦x = wold − 𝜂x
When the same x is presented again, we have
𝑓(x) = x𝑇wnew + 𝑏 = x𝑇wold − 𝜂x𝑇x+ 𝑏 < x𝑇wold + 𝑏
The output 𝑦′ = sign(𝑓(x)) is more likely to be 𝑦 = −1 as desired. Here
0 < 𝜂 < 1 is the learning rate.
∙ If (x, 𝑦 = 1) but 𝑦′ = −1 ̸= 𝑦 (case 3 above), then
wnew = wold + 𝜂𝑦x = wold + 𝜂x
When the same x is presented again, we have
𝑓(x) = x𝑇wnew + 𝑏 = x𝑇wold + 𝜂x𝑇x+ 𝑏 > x𝑇wold + 𝑏
The output 𝑦′ = sign(𝑓(x)) is more likely to be 𝑦 = 1 as desired.
Summarizing the two cases, we get the learning law:
if 𝑦𝑓(x) = 𝑦(x𝑇wold + 𝑏) < 0, then wnew = wold + 𝜂𝑦x
The two correct cases (cases 1 and 4) can also be summarized as
𝑦𝑓(x) = 𝑦(x𝑇w + 𝑏) ≥ 0
which is the condition a successful classifier should satisfy.
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4.1.5 Definition
For a decision hyper-plane x𝑇w + 𝑏 = 0 to separate the two classes P
(x𝑖, 1) and N (x𝑖,−1), it has to satisfy
𝑦𝑖(x
𝑇
𝑖 w + 𝑏) ≥ 0
for both x𝑖 ∈ 𝑃 and x𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 . Among all the planes that can actually satisfy our
condition, we are concerned in finding a plane that can separate the given two
classes in such a way that the margin between them is the maximum possible
margin [11].
The optimal plane which maximizes the margin has to lie somewhere in
between the two classes, to make the distance from the closest points on each
of its sides equal. We then draw two more planes 𝐻+ and 𝐻− that are parallel
to each other and also to 𝐻0 and also pass through the closest point to the
plain on both of its sides:
x𝑇w + 𝑏 = 1, and x𝑇w + 𝑏 = −1
All points x𝑖 ∈ 𝑃 on the positive side should satisfy
x𝑇𝑖 w + 𝑏 ≥ 1, 𝑦𝑖 = 1
and all points x𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 on the negative side should satisfy
x𝑇𝑖 w + 𝑏 ≤ −1, 𝑦𝑖 = −1
These can be combined into one inequality
𝑦𝑖(x
𝑇
𝑖 w + 𝑏) ≥ 1, (𝑖 = 1, . . . ,𝑚)
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The equality holds for those points on the planes 𝐻+ or 𝐻−. Such points are
called support vectors, for which
x𝑇𝑖 w + 𝑏 = 𝑦𝑖
i.e., the following holds for all support vectors
𝑏 = 𝑦𝑖 − x𝑇𝑖 w = 𝑦𝑖 −
𝑚∑︁
𝑗=1
𝛼𝑗𝑦𝑗(x
𝑇
𝑖 x𝑗)
4.2 Implementation
In our implementation of the SVM’s we used Rapid-miner studio a tool
available with multiple machine learning packages. This learner uses the Java
implementation of the support vector machine mySVM by Stefan Rueping.
The implementation of mySVM can both be utilized in regression task as well
as classification tasks and it provides a very fast implementation which gives
good results. mySVM works with all kind of functions, be it linear or quadratic
and it is also useful in case of asymmetric loss functions [27]. Figure 6 below
shows the design of the SVM process.
4.2.1 Design
Training Data: This corresponds to the training input file which is
expected to be an excel file with labelled data in form of tuples defined above.
Testing Data: This corresponds to the testing input file which is ex-
pected to be an excel file with un-labelled data in form of tuples defined
above.
SVM: This is the learner which generates a model by learning from the
Training data.
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Figure 6: SVM Design
Apply Model: This operator allows us to apply a model onto incoming
testing data.
Performance: This operator provides us with a list of performance cir-
teria’s which can be used to measure its performance and also for visualization
purposes.
4.2.2 Algorithm
Figure 7 explains the scoring process in detail. In our scenario we are us-
ing the SVM as a classifier which can classify Benign and Metamorphic files.
The features that our SVM is built on correspond to the scores that we re-
ceived from HMM, Simple Substitution and Opcode graph scoring techniques
as discussed in previous sections. The algorithm works in two phases -Training
Phase and Testing Phase. In Training Phase, we generate a model by training
on our training dataset which is formed by combining the scores from our three
different techniques i.e. HMM, Simple Substitution and Opcode graph as a
tuple along with a class description referring to as either Benign or Metamor-
phic file as shown in Figure 7. In Testing Phase, we apply the model that we
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created in the training phase to our testing dataset which is again the same
tuple along with a class description as shown in Figure 7.
Figure 7: SVM Scoring Process
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CHAPTER 5
Experiments
In this chapter we focus our attention on using the below mentioned tech-
niques to score a representative set of metamorphic malware:
∙ Hidden Markov Model Method
∙ Opcode Graph Similarity Method
∙ Simple Substitution Distance Method
∙ Combining all the above three using SVM’s
The first three of these methods work directly on the statistical properties
of opcodes and the last method works by combining the scores coming out of
these three techniques. Our test set of metamorphic viruses consists of 200
NGVKC files [31]. So all the results to follow in this chapter will revolve
around the NGVCK family to be representative of metamorphic files [25].
The NGVCK family of viruses in previous researches has proved that it is one
of the most highly metamorphic [33].
Our set of benign files consists of 40 cygwin utility files [6]. We have se-
lected these files for our experiments because we wanted to compare our results
with previous implementations which also used these files in their experiments,
including [33]. Finally we will be diversifying our malware dataset by moving
to a whole new families of metamorphic malware in the next chapter. We use
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ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristics) curves for comparing these tech-
niques to each other and for measuring their efficacy [4]. The Area under the
curve also refer to as AUC in coming sections, which is the area under this
ROC curve will provide us with a measure of the degree of correctness of each
of these techniques.
We used a machine with the below mentioned configuration:
Table 8: Machine Specification
Model MacBook Pro Retina
Processor 2.4 GHz Intel Core i5
RAM 8 GB 1600 MHz DDR3
System type 64-bit OS
Operating System OS X 10.9.5
5.1 Receiver Operating Characteristics
Receiver Operating Characteristics or in short ROC curve is a kind of
graph which is drawn to measure the correctness of a binary classifier [4].
We first calculate the TPR also known as true positive rate which is defined
as the number of positives that were predicted positives in actual out of the
total predicted positives. Then we calculate FPR also known as false positive
rate which is defined as the negative classifications which were accidentally
predicted as positives out of the total actual negatives. Once we have these
two values we plot the TPR vs the FPR at different levels of threshold to
generate an ROC curve. TPR is also known as sensitivity and FPR is also
known as the fall out of a classification system [9].
In the following sections we will be discussing about the results of the
above mentioned techniques in detail. We will be plotting ROC curves to
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compare their efficiency. We will also be using area under the curve or in
short AUC for these ROC curves as a measure of the correctness of these
scoring systems.
5.2 Hidden Markov Model Method
We did a lot of experiments so as to compare the results that we got for
our implementation against the scores produced in previous researches [23].
While performing our experiments we saw that the final score produced is not
effected much by the number of states that we have considered for the HMM.
So, we decided to go with 2 as the default number of states for HMM in our
experiments. In this particular experiment, we trained our HMM on a training
set which consisted of 160 NGVCK files to generate a model which we could
use for scoring similar files. Then we used this model to score another testing
set which consisted of 40 NGVCK files alongwith a compare set consisting of
40 Benign files. If we look at the scatter plot in Figure 8 we can clearly see
that there is a clear separation between the scores for both kind of files.
Figure 9 shows the corresponding ROC curve that has been plotted for the
results received in this experiment. From the curve it is very easy to deduce
that our HMM model is capable of producing great results and can easily
distinguish the family viruses from benign files. The AUC for this experiment
was 1.0, which further reinstates the fact that it produces perfect classification.
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Figure 8: HMM Score Analysis
Figure 9: ROC curve for HMM
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5.3 Opcode Graph Similarity
This experiment is based around the same setup where we use a subset of
160 NGVCK files for the training phase and use the remaining 40 files along
with 40 cygwin utility files for the testing dataset. We use the process defined
in Section 3.2.1 to establish a threshold value, which will further be used for
the actual distinction between the two type of files.
Figure 10 shows a scatterplot that we got after plotting the results from
our experiment. The red dots in the scatter plot denote the similarity score
between two different types of files in our experiment i.e. the malware and
benign files, whereas blue triangles denote the similarity score between two
files which belong to same malware family. Because there is a clear separation
between the two scores in Figure 10, we can clearly conclude that this method
is able to distinguish between the files correctly.
Figure 10: Opcode Graph Similarity Score Analysis
Figure 11 shows the corresponding ROC curve that has been plotted for
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the results received in this experiment. From the curve it is very easy to deduce
that our Opcode graph similarity method is capable of producing great results
and can easily distinguish the family viruses from benign files. The AUC for
this experiment was 1.0, which further reinstates the fact that it produces
perfect classification.
Figure 11: ROC curve for Opcode Graph Similarity Method
5.4 Simple Substitution Distance
In this experiment as well we used the same malware and benign files
as discussed above. The scores obtained in this experiment are plotted on
scatter plot as shown in Figure 12. From the scatter plot it is quite clear that
the malware files produce a lower score for this technique as compared to the
benign files which are quite different.
Figure 13 shows the corresponding ROC curve that has been plotted for
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Figure 12: Simple Substitution Method Score Analysis
the results received in this experiment. From the curve it is very easy to deduce
that our Simple Substitution method is capable of producing great results and
can easily distinguish the family viruses from benign files. The AUC for this
experiment was 1.0, which further reinstates the fact that it produces perfect
classification.
5.5 Support Vector Machine
In this experiment we are not devising a new technique for detection
of metamorphic malware by working on any of its characteristics, rather
our aim here is to see if we could combine the scores coming from the three
techniques defined above and use an SVM classifier to classify them. So,
here rather than directly working with malware and benign files we will be
working with scores generated by the three previous techniques as described
in Section 5.2, 5.3, 5.4. Once we have scores from the above three techniques,
we split them into two files with each containing a tuple:
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Figure 13: ROC curve for Simple Substitution Method
(𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙, 𝐻𝑀𝑀 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒, 𝑂𝐺𝑆 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒, 𝑆𝑆𝐷 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒)
The output from the support vector machine is a file which contains a tuple:
(𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙, 𝐻𝑀𝑀 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒, 𝑂𝐺𝑆 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒, 𝑆𝑆𝐷 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒, 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙)
as shown in Figure 7. We can then compare the predicted class label against
the actual class for calculating the performance of the model. The scores
obtained in this experiment are plotted on scatter plot as shown in Figure 14.
It can be observed that our SVM technique is able to distinguish between
metamorphic malware and benign file with an accuracy of 100%.
Figure 15 shows the corresponding ROC curve that has been plotted for
the results received in this experiment. From the curve it is very easy to deduce
that our Support vector machine method is also capable of producing results
that are similar to the one’s produced by the underlying techniques. The
AUC for this experiment was 1.0, which shows that it can easily distinguish
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Figure 14: Support Vector Machine Score Analysis
the metamorphic family files from benign files.
Figure 15: ROC curve for Support Vector Machine Method
In this experiment we have proved that Support Vector Machines can be
used to detect metamorphic malware by using the scores of Hidden Markov
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Model, Simple Substitution Distance and Opcode Graph Similarity techniques.
In the coming sections we will do an in-depth analysis of the robustness of our
underlying techniques that we have discussed above.
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CHAPTER 6
Results
In the previous section we have seen that Support Vector Machines can
be used to detect malware files from benign files by using scores from different
techniques. In the coming sections we will test the robustness of each of these
techniques. Our main aim is to prove that Support Vector Machines can serve
as a more robust detection strategy even when the underlying techniques have
failed.
6.1 Attacks on Detection Techniques
In this section, we consider the robustness of the above mentioned meta-
morphic detection techniques. In previous researches [15] for attacks on these
statistical metamorphic detection techniques, it has been observed that mor-
phing the metamorphic malware files by inserting code from benign files gives
the best results.
6.1.1 Morphing Techniques
In [15], a morphing engine was developed in order to evade detection
by known machine learning techniques such as the Hidden Markov Model
technique. The engine works by inserting dead code from a benign file into
a metamorphic file so as to beat the statistics of the metamorphic file which
make it susceptible to detection by HMM [23].
Two different forms of morphing strategies have been discussed in pa-
per [15]:
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∙ Block Morphing
∙ Random Morphing
In the first case, which we refer to as “block morphing”, the dead code
is inserted as a single block of code which is placed into the malware file
at one location. Whereas in “random morphing”, the dead code is inserted
uniformly into the malware file at constant intervals so as to spread the dead
code throughout its body. The paper proves that this method of insertion of
“dead code” into the malware file from a benign file is capable of defeating
the HMM detection, i.e. it is able to induce false negatives or false positives.
In the paper it has also been shown that the first method of insertion that is
block morphing is way more effective then the random morphing method.
We performed experiments at different levels of block morphing. The
amount of dead code inserted into the file depends on the size of the malware
file and is usually inserted as a percentage of its size. For example in order
to do a 20% morphing into a metamorphic file of 400 lines we would have to
insert 80 lines into it from a randomly selected benign file. The main point to
be noted here is that all the steps we are performing here are happening at the
assembly code level, but we are just making these changes to the static opcode
files that we already have. The assumption here is that in real world a malware
writer would have to put in a lot of effort to do the same modifications into
an executable, because he has to make sure that none of the inserted code
gets executed. Another thing that he has to worry about is that the inserted
code should not look obvious and should not be easily detected by someone
debugging the executable. So, by ignoring these practical problems which are
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involved in the insertion of dead code into a malware file, we are considering
the worst possible case that a malware writer would have to go through. In the
coming sections we look at results of our detection techniques against block
morphed NGVCK malware files.
6.2 Results for Morphed Malware
6.2.1 Hidden Markov Model Method
We started off by inserting different levels of opcodes into the NGVCK
files from randomly selected benign files. In Figure 16, we show a scatter plot
for HMM results for 10% morphed NGCVK malware files vs Benign files, from
the scatter plot it is clearly visible that there is no clear distinction between
the malware scores and the benign scores at 10% block morphing.
Figure 16: HMM - 10% morphed Scores Analysis
The ROC curve shown in Figure 17 below validates the fact, it can be
clearly inferred from the ROC curve that some of the files have been miss-
classified. The AUC for Figure 17 has been reduced to 0.90125 from its initial
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value of 1.000 for un-morphed Malware files vs Benign Files.
Figure 17: HMM - ROC curve for 10% morphing
Table 9 shows AUC value for ROC Curves plotted for different levels of
block morphing. From the table we can see that there is a considerable drop
in the AUC values at 10% and 20% block morphing levels, but the AUC values
for morphing levels greater than 20% tend to stabilize. Figure 18 shows the
graph for these results.
Table 9: HMM AUC values for different levels of Block Morphing
Morphing percentage AUC
0% 1.00000
10% 0.90125
20% 0.81625
30% 0.81875
40% 0.82250
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Figure 18: HMM AUC at different Morphing levels(Table 9)
6.2.2 Opcode Graph Similarity Method
In this experiment we inserted different percentages of opcodes into the
NGVCK files from randomly selected benign files. In Figure 19 we show a
scatter plot for Opcode Graph Similarity method results for 60% morphed
NGCVK malware files vs Benign files, from the scatter plot is clearly visible
that there is no clear distinction between the malware scores and the benign
scores at 10% block morphing. This technique turned out to be comparatively
more robust to HMM technique as it could withstand morphing levels of upto
50% before showing any kind of miss-classification.
The ROC curve shown in Figure 20 below validates the fact, it can be
clearly seen from the ROC curve that some of the files have been miss-classified
at 60% block morphing level. The AUC for Figure 20 has been reduced to
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Figure 19: OGS - 60% morphed Scores Analysis
0.91250 from its initial value of 1.000 for un-morphed Malware files vs Benign
Files.
Figure 20: OGS - ROC curve for 60% morphing
Table 10 shows AUC values for ROC Curves plotted for different levels
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of block morphing. From the table we can see that Opcode graph similarity
technique is more robust than HMM technique as at relatively moderate levels
of morphing it produced perfect results in the form of AUC value of 1.0. It
was only at about 60% block morphing the the results started to deteriorate
and the AUC value dropped to 0.91250. Figure 21 shows the graph for these
results.
Table 10: OGS AUC values for different levels of Block Morphing
Morphing percentage AUC
0% 1.00000
10% 1.00000
20% 1.00000
30% 1.00000
40% 1.00000
50% 1.00000
60% 0.91250
Figure 21: OGS AUC at different Morphing levels(Table 10)
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6.2.3 Simple Substitution Distance Method
In this experiment as well we inserted different percentages of opcodes into
the NGVCK files from randomly selected benign files. In Figure 22 we show a
scatter plot for Simple Substitution Distance method scores for 80% morphed
NGCVK malware files vs Benign files, from the scatter plot it is clearly visible
that there is no clear distinction between the malware scores and the benign
scores at 80% block morphing. This technique turned out to be comparatively
more robust to HMM technique, because it could withstand morphing levels
of upto 50% before showing any kind of miss-classification. It performed a
little better in comparison to the Opcode Graph Similarity technique as well,
it took about 80% block morphing to drop the AUC value to 0.89875 whereas
similar AUC was achieved in case of Opcode Graph Similarity at a morphing
level of 60%.
Figure 22: SS - 80% morphed Scores Analysis
The ROC curve shown in Figure 27 below validates the fact, it can be
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clearly seen from the ROC curve that some of the files have been miss-classified
at 80% block morphing level. The AUC for Figure 27 has been reduced to
0.89875 from its initial value of 1.000 for un-morphed Malware files vs Benign
Files.
Figure 23: SS - ROC curve for 80% morphing
Table 11 shows AUC values for ROC curves plotted for different levels
of block morphing. From the table we can see that Opcode graph similarity
technique is more robust than HMM technique as at relatively moderate levels
of morphing it produced perfect results in the form of AUC value of 1.0. It
was only at about 60% block morphing that the results started to deteriorate
and the AUC value dropped to 0.91250. Figure 24 shows the graph for these
results.
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Table 11: SS AUC values for different levels of Block Morphing
Morphing percentage AUC
0% 1.00000
10% 1.00000
20% 1.00000
30% 1.00000
50% 1.00000
60% 0.99750
70% 0.95063
80% 0.89875
Figure 24: SSD AUC at different Morphing levels(Table 11)
6.2.4 Combining Scores using SVM
In this experiment we want to see if SVM can provide us with better result
than individual scores from the three techniques mentioned above. Because the
maximum morphing % used to break all the techniques was registered in case
of Simple Substitution method, wherein it took about 80% block morphing to
bring the AUC down by a considerable level, we choose 80% morphing as a
benchmark. Now we generate scores for each of the three techniques at 80%
block morphing. Figure 25, 26, 27 below show the ROC curves generated by
each of the three techniques at 80% block morphing.
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Figure 25: HMM - ROC curve for 80% morphing
Figure 26: OGS - ROC curve for 80% morphing
In comparison to these above three, we can see that Support vector ma-
chine can produce better results by combining the scores from the above three
techniques. Figure 28 shows the ROC curve generated by SVM scores. The
AUC for this ROC curve is 1.0, which is better than the AUC achieved by any
of the three techniques individually at 80% block morphing level.
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Figure 27: SS - ROC curve for 80% morphing
We summarize these results in Table 12. If we take a look at the table it is
evident that SVM produced a perfect AUC score of 1.0 when all the individual
techniques had failed with AUC scores around 0.9. So we can conclude that
SVM’s can produce better results by combining scores generated by different
malware detection techniques. Figure 29 shows the graph for these results.
Table 12: Comparison of Scores at 80% Block Morphing
Scoring Technique AUC
Hidden Markov Models 0.85062
Opcode Graph Similarity 0.89875
Simple Substitution Distance 0.88437
Support Vector Machine 1.00000
6.2.4.1 SVM Kernel functions comparison
We tested different kernel methods for our SVM implementation, but got
the best results with radial kernel as shown in Table 13. So from here on, all
our experiments will be using the radial function as the kernel function.
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Figure 28: SVM - ROC curve for 80% morphed scores
Figure 29: AUC Comparison for 80% Block Morphed scores(Table 12)
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Table 13: Comparison of SVM Kernel Functions at 80% Block Morphing
SVM Kernel AUC
Dot 0.918
Polynomial 0.860
Neural 0.850
Radial 1.000
6.3 SVM vs Individual Techniques
In this section we compare the results produced by SVM against the re-
sults produced by each of our individual techniques. In Section 6.2.4 we saw
that SVM scores outperformed each of the techniques at a morphing level of
80%. Next we try to establish a morphing ratio wherein SVM’s perform better
than each of the individual techniques. Table 14 shows AUC values at differ-
ent morphing percentages for Hidden Markov Model(HMM), Opcode Graph
Similarity(OGS), Simple Substitution Distance(SSD) and Support Vector Ma-
chine(SVM) techniques respectively. From the table we can see that SVM is
a much more robust technique as compared to the other three.
Table 14: Comparison of Scores at Different Morphing levels
Morphing % HMM AUC OGS AUC SSD AUC SVM AUC
0% 1 1 1 1
10% 0.90125 1 1 1
20% 0.81625 1 1 1
30% 0.81875 1 1 1
40% 0.82250 1 1 1
50% 0.86250 1 1 1
60% 0.87875 0.91250 0.99750 1
70% 0.85437 0.90687 0.95063 1
80% 0.85062 0.88437 0.89875 1
90% 0.87625 0.87250 0.93812 1
100% 0.90000 0.85370 0.90750 1
110% 0.9 0.79563 0.90188 0.97906
120% 0.9 0.78125 0.87438 0.95875
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Figure 30 shows a line graph depicting the change in AUC values at
different morphing levels for all the four techniques. We can clearly see that
SVM performs way better than the other techniques even at 100% morphing
level. The morphing ratio where SVM shows up to be better than the three
underlying techniques is 60%. Now that we have proved that SVM’s can be
used to combine results from different malware detection techniques and still
produce better results, we would like to put it to test against some other virus
families to see how it performs as compared to the three underlying techniques.
Figure 30: Comparison of AUC Values at different Morphing levels
6.3.1 ZeroAccess Malware
In this experiment we want to validate how SVM performs against the in-
dividual techniques for ZeroAccess Malware. We extract the opcode sequences
from the ZeroAccess malware files and use them as the dataset for our malware
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detection techniques. For comparison we use the same set of benign files that
we used to compare against the NGVCK virus. Table 15 shows the compari-
son between AUC values for SVM and the underlying techniques, we can see
that for ZeroAccess Malware SVM outperforms the other three techniques and
provides us with better result.
Table 15: Comparison of Scores for Zero Access Malware
Scoring Technique AUC
Hidden Markov Models 0.97875
Opcode Graph Similarity 0.47531
Simple Substitution Distance 1
Support Vector Machine’s 1
6.3.2 Zbot Malware
In this experiment, we extract the opcode sequences from the Zbot mal-
ware files and use them as the dataset for our malware detection techniques.
Table 16 shows the comparison between AUC values for SVM and the un-
derlying techniques, we can clearly see that for Zbot Malware as well SVM
outperforms the other three techniques and provides us with better result.
Table 16: Comparison of Scores for Zbot Malware
Scoring Technique AUC
Hidden Markov Models 0.9875
Opcode Graph Similarity 0.61938
Simple Substitution Distance 0.675
Support Vector Machine’s 1
6.3.3 WinWebSec Malware
In this experiment as well we followed the same approach to generate
scores as in the above section. Table 17 shows the comparison between AUC
59
values for SVM and the underlying techniques. For WinWebSec malware fam-
ily HMM was able to distinguish between the malware and benign files with
an AUC of 1. Although the other two techniques were not able to distinguish
between malware and benign files, but by combining the scores from the three
techniques SVM was able to distinguish between the files with an AUC value
of 1. So we can see that in the above three cases SVM has performed at least
as well or better than the three individual techniques.
Table 17: Comparison of Scores for WinWebSec Malware
Scoring Technique AUC
Hidden Markov Models 1
Opcode Graph Similarity 0.85437
Simple Substitution Distance 0.93563
Support Vector Machine’s 1
6.3.4 SmartHDD Malware
In this experiment as well we followed the same approach to generate
scores as in the above section. This was the first experiment where we saw
that HMM performed better than SVM technique. Although the AUC value
produced by SVM was better than the AUC value for all the techniques but
HMM also produced good scores in this case. Table 18 shows the comparison
between AUC values for SVM and the underlying techniques for SmartHDD
malware.
Table 18: Comparison of Scores for SmartHDD Malware
Scoring Technique AUC
Hidden Markov Models 0.99875
Opcode Graph Similarity 0.94875
Simple Substitution Distance 0.91156
Support Vector Machine’s 1
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6.3.5 Harebot Malware
In this experiment we saw that that HMM performed as good as the
SVM technique. The AUC value produced by SVM was far better than the
AUC value for both Opcode graph similarity and Simple substitution distance.
The scores for both the Opcode graph technique as well as Simple substitu-
tion technique were very low and not suitable for any kind of classification
task. Table 19 shows the comparison between AUC values for SVM and the
underlying techniques for Harebot malware.
Table 19: Comparison of Scores for Harebot Malware
Scoring Technique AUC
Hidden Markov Models 1
Opcode Graph Similarity 0.4
Simple Substitution Distance 0.6125
Support Vector Machine’s 1
6.3.6 Sesh Malware
This was another experiment where we saw that HMM performed better
than the other two techniques but was still outperformed by SVM. Although
the AUC values from Opcode graph and Simple substitution techniques were
not sufficient to be used for practical malware detection purposes. Table 19
shows the comparison between AUC values for SVM and the underlying tech-
niques for Sesh malware.
6.3.7 Combined results
Here we look at the results from the above sections combined together in
Table 21. A bar graph representing the same scores is shown in Figure 31.
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Table 20: Comparison of Scores for Sesh Malware
Scoring Technique AUC
Hidden Markov Models 0.994
Opcode Graph Similarity 0.608
Simple Substitution Distance 0.583
Support Vector Machine’s 1
From the graph it is quite clear that SVM produce better results as compared
to the other three techniques when AUC values for each of the techniques are
above 0.7 in general. But if the AUC values from our underlying techniques
deteriorate further, then SVM scores are no better than individual scores.
Table 21: Combined Results
Malware HMM AUC OGS AUC SSD AUC SVM AUC
WinWebSec 1 0.85437 0.93563 1
Zbot 0.9875 0.61938 0.675 1
ZeroAccess 0.97875 0.47531 1 1
Sesh 0.994 0.608 0.583 1
Harebot 1 0.4 0.6125 1
SmartHdd 0.99875 0.94875 0.91156 1
Figure 31: Combined AUC Comparison(Table 21)
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6.3.8 Morphing results
After having the scores from all the techniques compared against the mali-
cia malware dataset, we wanted to see how the scores compared against each
other for different levels of morphing percentages against each of these malware
families. Tables 22,23,24,25,26,27 show the results for these experiments.
Table 22: Winwebsec
Morphing AUC
Percent HMM OGS SSD SVM
0 1 0.85437 0.93563 1
10 1 0.85937 0.91969 1
30 0.885 0.85438 0.91563 0.978
50 0.84875 0.81813 0.89437 0.938
70 0.82063 0.79062 0.86719 0.905
90 0.73063 0.76187 0.85438 0.905
110 0.72875 0.73312 0.85219 0.93
130 0.71312 0.70563 0.815 0.903
150 0.69063 0.6725 0.75969 0.867
Table 23: Zeroaccess
Morphing AUC
Percent HMM OGS SSD SVM
0 1 0.47531 1 1
10 0.42063 0.43125 1 1
30 0.1325 0.4125 1 1
50 0.11875 0.37 1 1
70 0.115 0.3825 1 1
90 0.12188 0.3775 0.981 1
110 0.13875 0.37125 0.973 0.998
130 0.14625 0.3625 0.969 0.975
150 0.145 0.33125 0.943 0.932
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Table 24: Zbot
Morphing AUC
Percent HMM OGS SSD SVM
0 0.9875 0.61938 0.675 1
10 0.9725 0.57875 0.77563 0.998
30 0.82875 0.51875 0.87125 0.99
50 0.79437 0.46875 0.85469 0.95
70 0.78375 0.43 0.8525 0.938
90 0.7975 0.4025 0.8275 0.952
110 0.70688 0.365 0.7825 0.905
130 0.69188 0.3375 0.74 0.86
150 0.43938 0.32875 0.68219 0.7
Table 25: Harebot
Morphing AUC
Percent HMM OGS SSD SVM
0 1 0.4 0.6125 1
10 0.78937 0.4075 0.69719 0.972
30 0.59437 0.36875 0.70281 0.872
50 0.515 0.33375 0.68812 0.702
70 0.52687 0.34375 0.72875 0.74
90 0.27125 0.32 0.72469 0.705
110 0.29125 0.30875 0.71188 0.73
130 0.21625 0.305 0.71469 0.822
150 0.22438 0.305 0.66844 0.9
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Table 26: Security Shield
Morphing AUC
Percent HMM OGS SSD SVM
0 0.994 0.608 0.58313 1
10 0.99375 0.59625 0.58312 1
30 0.77313 0.64625 0.76 0.87
50 0.75188 0.615 0.79375 0.798
70 0.7825 0.5925 0.76531 0.855
90 0.785 0.58375 0.7175 0.892
110 0.78187 0.5625 0.73625 0.865
130 0.72688 0.555 0.71562 0.788
150 0.7275 0.5425 0.68406 0.725
Table 27: Smart HDD
Morphing AUC
Percent HMM OGS SSD SVM
0 0.99875 0.94875 0.91156 1
10 0.9575 0.93125 0.87875 0.985
30 0.89 0.84 0.90844 1
50 0.8425 0.78313 0.88018 0.932
70 0.62062 0.72875 0.85781 0.885
90 0.46312 0.7 0.845 0.745
110 0.40312 0.68062 0.83375 0.778
130 0.39687 0.66875 0.79906 0.855
150 0.37 0.66063 0.74813 0.727
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CHAPTER 7
Conclusion and Future Work
The aim of this experiment was to design and test a system which could
combine the scores generated by existing detection techniques and produce
better results. The main idea behind it was that if we could combine the
scores generated by different malware detection technique, we could create
a technique which is more robust because it would be looking at different
characteristics of the same files. Such a combined approach could leverage the
relative strengths of each of its components to yield a stronger overall detector.
In our approach, we combined scores from Hidden Markov Model, Opcode
Graph Similarity and Simple Substitution Distance techniques using Support
Vector Machines as a classifier. It was found that Support Vector Machines
was able to detect the given malware files from benign files by combining three
different detection strategies into one.
In previous researches, it has been found that detection by these meth-
ods can be evaded by adding dead code. During our experiments, it was
observed that Hidden Markov Model, Opcode Graph Similarity, Simple Sub-
stitution Distance start misclassifying at 10%, 60% and 80% block morphing
respectively. Whereas we were able to use Support vector machine method to
combine the results from the above three techniques at each morphing level
and were still able to detect malware files from benign files even at 100% block
morphing level. We were able to establish that SVMs produced more robust
results and would only deteriorate in AUC after 100% morphing level, which
was way better in comparison to all the underlying techniques.
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The approach discussed in this paper can be used for all metamorphic
malware files. During our research we also validated our approach against
differing classes of metamorphic malware. We observed that Support Vector
machine method was able to produce equivalent or better results for most of the
malware families. We also noted that SVM generally tends to perform better
when the AUC values for the underlying detection techniques are greater than
0.8, when AUC values start to decrease below 0.8, the performance of SVM
method deteriorates.
Future work for this experiment can include enhancing our SVM technique
even further. In our experiments we used statistical detection techniques such
as Hidden Markov Model, Opcode Graph Similarity and Simple Substitution
Distance as the underlying types for our method. In order to improve this
method even further, we could incorporate some more detection techniques to
our underlying detection strategies for Support Vector Machine classifier.
Finally, it could be really useful if we had a standard metamorphic mal-
ware dataset, so that we could compare the results of our proposed detection
scheme, based on its performance against this standard data-set.
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APPENDIX
ROC Curves
A.1 Hidden Markov Model
Figure A.32: ROC curve for Hare-
bot - HMM
Figure A.33: ROC curve for Sesh -
HMM
Figure A.34: ROC curve for
SmartHDD - HMM
Figure A.35: ROC curve for Win-
WebSec - HMM
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Figure A.36: ROC curve for Zbot -
HMM
Figure A.37: ROC curve for Ze-
roAccess - HMM
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A.2 Opcode Graph Similarity Method
Figure A.38: ROC curve for Hare-
bot - OGS
Figure A.39: ROC curve for Sesh -
OGS
Figure A.40: ROC curve for
SmartHDD - OGS
Figure A.41: ROC curve for Win-
WebSec - OGS
Figure A.42: ROC curve for Zbot -
OGS
Figure A.43: ROC curve for Ze-
roAccess - OGS
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A.3 Simple Substitution Distance Method
Figure A.44: ROC curve for Hare-
bot - SS
Figure A.45: ROC curve for Sesh -
SS
Figure A.46: ROC curve for
SmartHDD - SS
Figure A.47: ROC curve for Win-
WebSec - SS
Figure A.48: ROC curve for Zbot -
SS
Figure A.49: ROC curve for Ze-
roAccess - SS
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A.4 Support Vector Machine Method
Figure A.50: ROC curve for Hare-
bot - SVM
Figure A.51: ROC curve for Sesh -
SVM
Figure A.52: ROC curve for
SmartHDD - SVM
Figure A.53: ROC curve for Win-
WebSec - SVM
Figure A.54: ROC curve for Zbot -
SVM
Figure A.55: ROC curve for
ZeroAccess- SVM
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